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Abstract
Background: Phishing is a widely known phenomenon, but currently lacks a
commonly accepted definition. As a result, many studies about phishing use their
own definition. The lack of a common definition prevents knowledge accumulation
and makes analysing studies or aggregating data about phishing a difficult task.
Method: To develop a definition, we used existing definitions as input and
combined them using crime science theories as the theoretical framework. A
systematic review of the literature up to August 2013 was conducted, resulting in
2458 publications mentioning the word phishing. All journal articles, together
with both highly cited and recent conference papers were selected, giving a total
of 536 peer-reviewed publications (22%) to be manually reviewed. This resulted
in 113 distinct definitions to be analysed.
Results: An analysis identified key concepts that were found in most definitions
and formed the building blocks for a consensual definition. We propose a new
definition that is based upon current ones, which defines phishing in a
comprehensive way and - in our opinion - addresses all important elements of
phishing: ‘phishing is a scalable act of deception whereby impersonation is used
to obtain information from a target’.
Conclusions: A consensual definition allows future research to be aligned and it
facilitates the interpretation and comparison of existing research. The findings
suggest that the routine activity approach can be applied to the digital world.
Finally, the ‘scalability’ concept of our definition provides a new theoretical
notion to digital crime that is independent of the employed channel.
Keywords: phishing; definition; cybercrime; crime; Internet; digital crime
Background
The term phishing is currently widely used with thousands of mentions in the scien-
tific literature, lots of media coverage and widespread attention from organisations
such as banks and law enforcement agencies. However, this prompts a question:
what exactly is phishing? In some publications, the phenomenon of phishing is
explicitly defined; in some, it is described by means of an example, while others as-
sume that the reader already knows what phishing is. Many authors propose their
own definition of phishing, leading to a large number of different definitions in the
scientific literature.
With no scientific consensus, other sources could provide a standard definition.
The first point of reference for finding the definition of a word would be a dictio-
nary. Four definitions from prominent English dictionaries are shown in Table 1.
Additionally, it lists the definition of the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG), a
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non-profit foundation that keeps track of phishing. The APWG definition is rather
lengthy compared to the dictionary definitions. The five definitions vary in the level
of detail and the scope of the phenomenon. For example, whereas the American Her-
itage definition includes phone calls, the others do not. In addition, the goal of phish-
ing differs in the definitions, ranging from financial account details (Collins, APWG)
to the more general personal information (Oxford, Merriam-Webster, American Her-
itage). There is greater consensus about the origin of the term phishing; it was first
used around 1995-1996 (James, 2005; Khonji et al., 2013; Press, 2012; Purkait, 2012)
and is a variation on the word ‘fishing’, something hackers commonly did (James,
2005; McFedries, 2006; Press, 2012; Purkait, 2012). In common with fishing, phish-
ing is about setting out ‘hooks’, hoping to get a ‘bite’.
The lack of a standard definition of phishing has been observed previously (Abu-
Nimeh et al., 2007; Al-Hamar et al., 2011; Khonji et al., 2013). This causes several
problems for scientists, practitioners and consumers. For scientists, it is difficult to
compare research on phishing in a meaningful way. Aggregating research consists of
classification (in which attacks are considered phishing), and identification (measur-
ing how often it occurs). Furthermore, countermeasures against phishing cannot be
effectively evaluated without knowing the extent of the phenomenon. Additionally,
having no standard definition is an indication of the immaturity of the field with
researchers refining their own definitions over the years (e.g., (Kumaraguru et al.,
2007, 2010), (Moore, 2007; Moran & Moore, 2010) and (Hong, 2012; Xiang & Hong,
2009; Xiang et al., 2011)). Institutions, such as banks or governments, face problems
understanding one another if their definitions of phishing are different. For exam-
ple, one bank may consider a fraudulent phone call to be phishing, whereas another
bank will not, making a comparison of victimisation or countermeasures difficult.
Consumers may also experience the downside of a lack of a standard definition.
Persons who are less computer literate, for example, may become confused when
several awareness campaigns describe phishing differently.
We aim to clarify the definition of the phishing phenomenon by analysing existing
definitions, in contrast to most standard definitions, which are developed using
expert panels. The resulting definition is based on consensus drawn from literature,
and is sufficiently abstract to support future developments. To the best of our
knowledge, no previous attempt has been made to synthesise a definition of phishing.
In order to interpret existing definitions of phishing in the right context, one
needs a theoretical framework. An initial exploration revealed that phishing con-
tains elements from criminal activities. Crime science theories are used for crime
in the physical world, which raises the question of their applicability in the digital
world. Previous research supports the idea of applying crime science theories to
digital crime (Pratt et al., 2010; Reyns et al., 2011; Yar, 2005) and there is lim-
ited evidence of its applicability to phishing (Hutchings & Hayes, 2009). Therefore,
crime science theories are used to achieve a better understanding of phishing and
to provide us with concepts to analyse it. The focus of crime science is on the
opportunity for a crime, rather than on the characteristics of the criminal. Three
theories on crime opportunity form the foundation of crime science (Clarke, 2009;
Felson & Clarke, 1998): the Rational Choice Perspective; Crime Pattern Theory;
and the Routine Activity Approach. Each of these theories takes a distinctly differ-
ent approach to crime (Clarke, 2009). The rational choice perspective offers a view
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on offender’s decision-making, assuming bounded rationality (Cornish & Clarke,
2008). An offender is assumed to make a rational decision and commit a crime if
the perceived benefit outweighs the perceived cost. Crime pattern theory (Brant-
ingham & Brantingham, 1993, 2008) focuses on the relation between crime and
the physical environment, in particular the crime opportunities that emerge in the
daily lives of the offender. According to crime pattern theory, crime is not ran-
domly distributed in time and space. For example, a potential offender may come
across opportunities for crime during his regular daily commute. Finally, the rou-
tine activity approach (Cohen & Felson, 1979) states that a crime occurs when a
likely offender and a suitable target converge in the absence of a capable guardian.
Routine activity theory can be interpreted broadly (Pratt et al., 2010; Reyns et al.,
2011) to include crime without direct contact. For example, in the case of cyber bul-
lying an online chat room can be the location where an offender and victim “meet”.
The focus on offender decision making within the rational choice perspective makes
this theory less suited for reasoning about phishing, since the offender is mostly
unknown. Similarly, applying crime pattern theory is difficult for phishing, since it
often occurs on the Internet. The routine activity approach however, is applicable
to phishing (Hutchings & Hayes, 2009) with concepts such as offender and target,
especially useful.
To elaborate upon the routine activity approach, crime scripts (Cornish, 1994;
Schank & Abelson, 1975) can be used. Crime scripts describe the sequential steps
that lead to an offence, much like a film script. Using crime scripts allows for in-
terpretation of definitions of phishing in such a way that the act of phishing is
decomposed into several steps. An example of such a step is “Victim receives an
email”. To fully understand each definition, we decompose each step into several key
concepts. To structure the identification and classification of these concepts, we use
the 3A model (El Helou et al., 2010). The 3A model is an activity-centric frame-
work that provides three categories: Actors, Assets and Activities. In the context of
phishing, actors are humans (e.g., the offenders) who conduct activities (e.g., send
a message) to achieve their goal. The goal itself could be to obtain an asset (e.g.,
credentials). The routine activity approach together with the tools of crime scripts
and the 3A model, are used to identify relevant concepts within each definition.
The goal of the literature search is to find scientific definitions of phishing. We
formulated the following research question: How is phishing defined in the research
community? Three steps are taken to generate a definition. Firstly, relevant litera-
ture is selected and definitions of phishing are extracted. Secondly, the concepts of
phishing are extracted and scored according to their occurrence. Finally, concepts
that are found in most definitions are selected and a standard consensual definition
is developed from these concepts.
Method
Selection of Literature
To obtain data on the existing definitions of phishing, a systematic study of the peer-
reviewed scientific literature was performed, following the guidelines of Kitchen-
ham (Kitchenham & Charters, 2007). Three digital libraries were selected for the
search: ACM digital library, IEEExplore and Scopus. The fields relevant to phishing,
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such as computer science and various social sciences (i.e., psychology or criminol-
ogy), are covered by these three databases. The literature search (see Figure 3)
resulted in 2458 publications up to August 2013 that used the word ‘phishing’ in
the title, abstract or keywords. We filtered the publications based on our exclusion
criteria: studies had to be written in English to be included in our selection, so that
we could run a syntactical analysis on them, and had to be peer-reviewed.
After filtering, the literature set was narrowed down to 312 journal articles and
1774 conference papers. Since it was not feasible to read all publications, we created
a subset of the literature to be reviewed manually. Journals generally have less strict
review deadlines than conferences, resulting in longer reviews and possibly higher
quality. In addition, generally journals have higher limits on the number of pages,
resulting in more in-depth articles. Therefore, we included all 312 journal articles
in the review. Turning to the 1774 conference papers, we note that in the field of
computer science, publishing in conference proceedings is generally favoured (Freyne
et al., 2010), whereas journals are preferred in other fields. For the conference papers,
we used the number of citations as an indication of quality and based our selection
on this criterion. This resulted in the inclusion of 135 conference papers with more
than 10 citations each. However, the selection based on citation count may exclude
high quality conference publications that have recently been published and thereby
have not yet received many citations. Therefore, we included all 69 recent conference
papers from 2013 (from January to August) and the 20 newest from 2012.
All 536 eligible publications were manually searched for definitions of phishing
by performing a case-insensitive search for the word ‘phish’, so that abbreviations
within the paper would also be covered. If a definition was present, it was extracted
for further analysis. Studies were excluded if they: (1) did not include a definition,
or at least a clear and concise description, of the word phishing; or (2) merely
cited a definition of others. If an included paper cited the definition from another
peer-reviewed publication (7 occurrences), the cited publication was included in
our dataset. The approach involved considering not only explicit definitions but
also descriptions of phishing in terms of concepts. Definitions had to be one or two
sentences in length, but longer definitions were included if they were clear and to the
point. However, publications giving only a specific example, such as an anecdote,
were not included.
Since the search was performed by a single researcher, the extraction of defini-
tions was re-evaluated by a second researcher by randomly selecting 100 publications
from the dataset. The second researcher then manually reviewed each publication
to identify a definition. The two sets of results were compared and the inter-rater
reliability (Cohen’s Kappa) was found to be K = 0.70 (p < 0.001) with a 95% con-
fidence interval of (0.561, 0.839), indicating substantial agreement and supporting
the feasibility of the method.
Careful analysis of the 118 extracted definitions resulted in the exclusion of five
of them as non-cited duplicates. Among the duplicate definitions, we selected the
definition that had been published the earliest and excluded the others. This re-
duced our dataset to 113 unique definitions, all of which can be found in the online
appendix.
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Identification of common words
We initially analysed the definitions in a purely syntactical way (i.e., without con-
text) to obtain an overview of the most commonly used words. The analysis con-
sisted of a simple frequency count of all words to establish which ones occur most
often. Although a frequency count removes all contextual information from the in-
dividual words, it does give an indication of the relative importance of each word
compared to all the others. In addition, words that appear throughout all defini-
tions are probably important to phishing. All definitions were first processed by
removing all punctuation, putting all words in singular form and merging different
spellings. For example, ‘credit-card’ became ‘creditcard’, ‘ID theft’ became ‘iden-
tity theft’, and ‘web page’ became ‘webpage’. Multiple occurrences of a single word
were counted only once per definition to avoid biasing the frequency count. All ad-
verbs were removed, since they give no additional information in a frequency count.
Finally, the word phishing itself was removed from all definitions, as counting its
occurrences would not give any insights. The resulting list of definitions contains
normalised words (i.e., singular form, one spelling, no punctuation), which was anal-
ysed to get some basic understanding of the concept of phishing. The result of the
frequency count was plotted in a ‘word cloud’ (McNaught & Lam, 2010), where the
font size of the words represents the number of occurrences relative to other words,
i.e., the word that is mentioned the most, is set in the largest font.
Identification of concepts
In order to make sense of the set of definitions, we need to identify concepts by
combining words with common meaning. This is required since the results of the
frequency count are insufficient for words that refer to the same concept. For ex-
ample, an attacker, criminal, crook, conman and variations thereof are all types of
offender. In a simple frequency count, such as a word cloud, these individual words
would occur in low frequencies, but the overall concept (offender) would occur less
frequently.
Firstly, we drew a random sample (n=20) from the set of definitions. By analysing
this sample and highlighting words, we established which of them were relevant in
each definition. We used the theoretical framework (crime science, crime scripts,
3A-model) to determine whether a word is relevant to phishing. The routine activ-
ity approach states that phishing requires a motivated offender, a suitable target
and the absence of a capable guardian. In the context of phishing, the motivated
offender initiates the phishing attack, the suitable target is the intended target,
and no capable guardian (such as a phishing filter) is present (Hutchings & Hayes,
2009). For each definition, we tried to identify these actors. Then, we identified
the phases of phishing that each definition assumes. Hong (2012) identifies three
phases: (1) potential victim receives a message; (2) the victim takes the suggested
action; (3) offender monetises the information. Others identified phases of phishing
from the viewpoint of the offender (Bose & Leung, 2008), or with more detail about
the methods (Forte, 2009). Essentially, these phases are all high-level crime scripts.
Using the phases of phishing as a framework, we identified in what way the defi-
nitions structure a phishing attack. In each definition, we highlight the words that
could relate to a particular phase of phishing, even when the authors do not identify
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the phases explicitly. For example, Herzberg (2009) defines phishing as ‘Password
theft via fake websites’, whereas Amin et al. (2012) state that phishing is ‘email
soliciting personal information’. Herzberg focuses on the way passwords are stolen,
not on how potential targets are drawn to the websites. Amin et al., on the other
hand, identify the method of attracting potential targets, but do not explicitly state
to whom the personal information is sent, or how this is done. Furthermore, after
having highlighted words from the theoretical framework and words relating to the
phases of phishing, any remaining words (i.e., nouns, verbs or adjectives) used to
define the process of phishing are highlighted as well.
The result of the identification of important words in the sample of 20 definitions
is a list of nouns, verbs and adjectives. In several iterations, synonyms and words
referring to the same concept are merged. For example, the words ‘creditcard num-
bers’, ‘credentials’ and ‘sensitive data’ refer to the concept ‘information’. In each
iteration, we tried to find which words were related in an attempt to merge them
into one concept. This resulted in 18 concepts, categorised as 3 actors, 1 asset and
14 activities (Table 2). All 93 remaining definitions were analysed using these 18
concepts to see whether they can be described as a subset of them. A second rater
re-evaluated the extraction of concepts. Since the data are based on the output of
the raters, Kappa is not the correct statistic to calculate the level of agreement (Fe-
instein & Cicchetti, 1990). In this case, the proportion of agreements (agreements
divided by non-agreements) was used, which was 0.78. This substantial agreement
supports the applicability of the method and indicates the clarity of the theoretical
framework for the raters.
The results of the frequency count, as shown in the word cloud, together with the
theoretical framework, were used to label the concepts with the most commonly
used terminology.
Analysis of concepts
All definitions were scored on the 18 identified concepts that were extracted. To-
gether with the meta-data for each definition (i.e., year of publication, field and
country of affiliation of first author), the results were entered into a data file. Fre-
quency analysis was used to determine which concepts were the most important.
This frequency analysis consists of establishing whether there is consensus within
the set of definitions on whether to include or exclude a concept. For each concept,
we determined whether the definitions agree on either inclusion or exclusion by cal-
culating whether the number of definitions that use the concept differs significantly
(p < 0.05) from 50% by using Pearson’s chi-square test, the results of which can
be found in Table 2. This results in three categories: (1) concepts that are used in
significantly fewer than 50% of the definitions; (2) concepts where there is no clear
consensus; (3) concepts that are mentioned in significantly more than 50% of the
definitions. Concepts where there is consensus are either included (category 1) or
excluded (category 3). The remaining concepts from category 2, where there is no
consensus, are considered in the discussion section.
Finally, we calculate the Pearson’s correlation between the year of publication and
each concept, to identify evolution of the definitions with respect to the emerging
concepts.
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Validity
One of the threats to the validity of our study is that the review was conducted
by a single researcher. However, subjective decisions are mitigated by following a
systematic protocol and discussing this, and the results of the exercise, with senior
researchers. Additionally, a second researcher replicated the method. Cases where
the second rater disagreed with the initial rater were discussed, which led to the
inclusion of six definitions that had previously not been included. For the extraction
of concepts, differences were discussed, leading to no changes in the 18 included
concepts.
By including peer-reviewed scientific literature only, we were able to search sys-
tematically for all publications on phishing in three digital libraries. Due to the goal
of this research, i.e., finding out how phishing is defined in the research community,
only scientific research was included. Our design suffers from a publication bias,
since all included definitions are peer-reviewed. There may be very comprehensive
definitions beyond the scientific domain. If this were to be the case, we assume that
a large number of research papers would reference this definition.
Although our approach of selecting publications covers a large set of the available
literature, there is the possibility of not including a relevant publication. However,
we minimise this potential bias by selecting based on citation count (i.e., 10 or
more), source (i.e., all journals) and including recent conference papers (i.e., from
2013 and the latest 20 from 2012). If a definition of high importance to the field has
been established, it is likely to have been cited by many. In addition, if an included
paper cites a definition from another publication, the cited publication is included in
our dataset, thereby further decreasing the potential of missing of a key definition.
Finally, due to the large number of definitions, it is unlikely that the results would
have been different by including a small number of additional definitions.
The extraction of concepts was based on a sample of the definitions, which could
result in certain concepts not being included. We mitigated this by comparing all
definitions against the identified concepts, to find out whether any definition had a
different concept. Additionally, as mentioned before, another researcher reviewed a
random sample of the publications. A consequence of a consensual definition is that
is it based on concepts that are used in the majority of the source definitions. We
did not conduct any quality assessment of the publications. The quality control was
implicitly performed by including all journal articles and highly cited conference
papers.
Results
The total sample of selected publications consisted of roughly 22% (n=536) of the
available peer-reviewed literature. This subset of the literature covers highly cited
publications, journal articles and recent publications. The selection covers, in our
opinion, most of the important literature on phishing. After review, 113 distinct
definitions were extracted from the peer-reviewed literature. The definitions were
analysed at the level of words and concepts.
The word cloud (Figure 1) shows the results of the frequency analysis that was
used to analyse the words. The five most-used words are information, website, user,
personal and email. From the figure, we can identify the actors, assets and activities.
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Actors are user, victim, attacker, bank and business. The assets that were found are
information, website, email, password, creditcard, username and account. Finally,
activities such as an attack, social engineering, identity theft or spoofing are most
often used.
Eighteen concepts were extracted from the definitions (Table 2). Two of these
concepts are common to the routine activity approach: an offender and a target.
There is a weak relationship between usage of the concept social engineering in the
definition and the year of publication (r(105) = .23, p = .015). This indicates that
recent publications refer to social engineering more often than older publications.
The presence of other concepts and the year of publication were not related, giving
no evidence of evolution of the definitions with regard to other concepts.
The concepts that are used most frequently in the definitions lead to the following
phishing crime script. First, the offender sends a communication to the target, which
62 of the definitions state. Typically, the offender sends the target an email (n=30)
or sends a message using a method that is not specified (n=22), occasionally using
other methods such as websites (Hodgson, 2005; Levy, 2004; Olurin et al., 2012),
social spaces (Piper, 2007), instant messages (Ali & Rajamani, 2012; Verma et al.,
2012), text messaging (Hinson, 2010) or even letters (Workman, 2008). Then, the
target may reply by sending information to the offender, which is mentioned in 64 of
the definitions, mostly through the use of a website (n=40). The information that is
transmitted, according to 113 definitions, can be categorised as: (1) authentication
credentials (n=13); (2) identity information (n=5); (3) sensitive information (n=23);
or (4) personal information (n=24). Variations or combinations account for the
remaining types of information.
The results of the analysis of concepts are shown in Table 2. In the literature, there
is a consensus that the concepts of deception (n=79), a target (n=87), information
(n=105), being digital (n=87) and Internet-based (n=84) should be mentioned in
a definition. Furthermore, the concepts of fraud (n=43), an offender (n=40), per-
suasion (n=30), the abuse of information (n=22), identity theft (n=20) and social
engineering (n=19) should not be included according to a significant majority of
the definitions. There is no consensus for the remaining concepts.
Figure 2 shows the number of publications per year that define phishing, indicating
several peaks in the number of definitions within particular years. Partly, this is due
to the criteria used in the literature selection. For example, the peak in 2013 is due
to the inclusion of all recent conference papers. However, that does not explain
the decrease of definitions in 2008, and the increase thereafter. Such changes could
indicate emerging consensus about the definition, so that authors start citing earlier
definitions they consider useful, or, where there is a rise in the number of definitions,
a change in the phenomenon might be developing, requiring redefinition.
The research field and affiliation of the first author show that mostly researchers
located in the USA (n=53) or in the field of Computer Science (n=88) define phish-
ing. Other countries in which the first author is located include the UK (n=9),
China (n=8), India (n=7), Canada (n=7) and Australia (n=6). There is a signifi-
cant correlation between the year of publication and the first author being affiliated
within the USA (r(105) = -.46, p < 0.001)), indicating that recent definitions origi-
nate more often from countries other than the USA. Almost no definitions originate
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from research fields other than Computer Science, with Psychology (n=4) or Law
(n=3) as largest contributors. For 14 authors, it was not possible to establish the
research field (for example, when the first author is a journalist). A possible rea-
son for the large number of computer scientists who produce their own definition
of phishing, is that they feel more inclined or capable to define phishing, whereas
researchers from other fields would rather use another author’s definition, or none
at all.
Discussion
The present study identified concepts of phishing according to the peer-reviewed
literature. There is a consensus on most concepts, with seven concepts present in
approximately half of the definitions. We discuss each of these concepts and consider
whether they should be included in the definition. However, we first observe that
the concept ‘Internet-based’ is a subset of the concept ‘digital’ and therefore, one
is redundant. As Internet-based is the most precise concept, arguably it should be
included in the definition. This, however, leads to the discrepancy that instant mes-
saging through an Internet-based application on a phone can be phishing, whereas
a regular text message on a phone cannot (not Internet-based), even though both
methods are essentially the same. In our view, phishing was made possible due to
the ability to mass-distribute messages. Whereas the Internet has served as a cat-
alyst, in facilitating communication cost efficiently, it is not the only way to do so.
We propose to replace the concepts of Internet-based and digital with scalability.
Being scalable refers to the ease of scaling from a single occurrence to hundreds,
thousands or millions. Whereas digital specifies the encoding used for the channel
(in bits, ‘0’ or ‘1’) and Internet-based is a specific channel, scalability only requires
the channel to support mass-distribution.
We decided to exclude the concept of ‘mentioning a trusted third party’ (included
in 50 of the definitions) in favour of impersonation (n=60), since deception through
impersonation by abusing the target’s trust implies the existence of a trusted third
party. The communication between a target and an offender is mentioned in slightly
over half of the definitions (n=62 and n=64). However, we decided to exclude the
explicit mentioning of communication, as this follows from the exchange of infor-
mation from a target to an offender. Using websites (n=56) or messages (n=51)
as specific channels for phishing were not included since these are absent from a
significant majority of the definitions. Phishing as a criminal activity is not included
in the list of essential concepts, even though 61 of the definitions mention this, as
it is included in deception and furthermore depends on legislation in a particular
jurisdiction.
Consequently, the concepts of deception, impersonation, target, information and
scalability are the most important aspects of a phishing definition. Therefore, we
propose a definition of phishing that comes out of the synthesis of literature and
includes all the important concepts that existing definitions have in common:
Phishing is a scalable act of deception whereby impersonation is used to obtain
information from a target.
A first observation is that our definition provides a high level of abstraction,
compared to most alternatives. This derives from the method used. The consequence
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of this is that there are no details about specific methods (such as email or websites)
required to perform a phishing attack. By comparing our definition to those in Table
1, it can be seen that our definition is sufficiently abstract to be compatible with
the dictionary and APWG definitions. The Oxford, Collins and Merriam-Webster
definitions can be mapped entirely onto our definition, as they are more specific.
For example, our definition does not include the offender’s misuse of the obtained
information, such as identity theft. The APWG definition is compatible as well,
although it is much more specific to what is considered phishing. For example, the
APWG definition specifically mentions ‘technical subterfuge’ schemes that tamper
with a target’s PC, such as installing a virus, whereas our definition – being broader
– states that deception and impersonation are used. Whether or not this is followed
by, or consists of, technical subterfuge, is not mentioned. Therefore, we consider
the APWG definition to be compatible to ours. Finally, the American Heritage
definition is the only one that is not completely compatible, since it mentions the
use of a telephone, which does not scale well.
The methods employed in phishing could be used long before the Internet became
popular. However, the term phishing only arose around 1995-1996 (James, 2005;
Khonji et al., 2013; Press, 2012; Purkait, 2012), indicating that mass-communication
is one of the foundations of phishing. Another factor contributing to the suc-
cess of phishing on the Internet is that it is cost-effective for mass-communication
(i.e., spreading millions of messages). Although both are potential forms of mass-
communication, letters and telegraph messages are more costly to employ on a large
scale, whereas sending emails over the Internet is cheaper. This contributed to the
success of the Internet as a channel for phishing. Other channels, such as telegraph
messages or text messages, can be scalable, apart from the potentially high costs of
sending millions of messages.
Only one indication of the evolution of phishing definitions was found: the ten-
dency to refer to Social Engineering in papers that are more recent. However, there
could still have been evolution within the literature on the act of phishing. For exam-
ple, authors may have identified specific methods of phishing throughout the years,
which in our analysis were mapped onto the same concept. Additionally, recent
publications that define phishing more often have a first author with an affiliation
not in the USA, whereas early definitions originate mainly from the USA. This
could indicate that authors from outside the USA feel the need to redefine phish-
ing because of local differences, or indicate more international interest in phishing.
However, this could also be a result of the inclusion criteria (i.e., publication in
English), or more interest or funding in the United States for phishing research.
Conclusions
The goal of this research was to identify a consensual definition of phishing from the
literature. In the literature search, 113 different definitions were found, indicating
that many researchers have thought about a definition of phishing. We identified
the core concepts which the research community agrees are part of phishing, re-
sulting in a consensual definition: ‘Phishing is a scalable act of deception whereby
impersonation is used to obtain information from a target.’
The principles of phishing were used by offenders long before the advent of the
computer and the Internet. Before computers became a consumer product, these
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principles were considered a type of fraud. Digitalisation and mass-communication
through networks provide new channels to exploit the same human vulnerabilities on
a larger scale. The Internet opened many opportunities for new types of fraudulent
behaviour, such as phishing. Phishing on particular channels is sometimes named
differently, such as SMSishing (channel is SMS). We consider these types of phishing
if they fit the consensual definition that we developed.
The implications for other definitions are mainly caused by the concepts scalable,
deception and impersonation. Phishing must use deception by impersonation in
order to be called phishing. When no impersonation is used, for example just asking
for information, the act cannot be called phishing. Furthermore, it should be easy to
scale, implying that one-to-one communication, such as a phone call, is not phishing.
Spear phishing, which is phishing with a single target, is possible, as long as the
employed method supports scalability.
The main theoretical contribution of this study is threefold. Firstly, we validated
the findings of Hutchings & Hayes (2009), Reyns et al. (2011) and Pratt et al.
(2010) that the routine activity approach, developed for explaining crime in the
physical world, can be applied to the digital world. Within the context of phish-
ing, routine activities include, for example, giving one’s email address away, time
spent on the Internet, time spent on email. Such routine activities could lead to
more opportunity for victimisation. Additionally, we suggest the notion of crime
facilitation to be relevant to cybercrime, and specifically phishing. People can de-
liberately, negligently or unconsciously facilitate their own victimisation by placing
themselves at special risk (Sparks, 1982). The second theoretical contribution of
this research is the development of a consensual definition of phishing. Yar (2012)
states that networked communications act as a force-multiplier and that the impact
is further increased by a space-time compression, whereby actions can occur almost
instantly in different locations. Therefore, he argues that new theoretical notions are
required for theorising about cybercrime. We believe these notions are manifested
in the concept ‘scalability’ of the consensual definition and therefore constitute the
third theoretical contribution.
This research adds a consensual definition of phishing to the body of existing
definitions so that others can be weighed against the concepts with consensus within
the research community. Research can be aligned by using a common definition,
thereby avoiding misinterpretations. Researchers who define phishing differently
can relate their definition to the consensual one, thus positioning better which
actions they consider phishing. Furthermore, meta-studies on phishing are better
facilitated with our definition. Institutions, such as the police or banks, benefit from
a consensual definition as well. Collaboration and data sharing between different
organisations is easier if both have a common vocabulary. Organisations labelling
phishing incidents according to a consensual definition will find it easier to compare
the effectiveness of countermeasures.
Future research could focus on translating and interpreting the consensual defini-
tion into other languages. The consensual definition can be related to the definitions
that practitioners use, thereby extending this study into the non-scientific domain.
Furthermore, a discussion in the research community should establish more clarity
on the concepts where there is no consensus at this moment. We believe that the
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lessons learned in crime science and the theories and tools that crime scientists de-
veloped, should be applied to phishing. In particular, we suggest studying the notion
of crime facilitation in cybercrime, in addition to crime opportunity. Ultimately, a
collaboration of crime science and computer science could help in reducing phishing
victimisation and avoid reinventing the wheel.
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Figures
Figure 1: A word cloud of the phishing definitions.
A graphical representation of the most-used words in the definitions called a ‘word cloud’. The font size
represents the number of occurrences; words in a larger font are used more than fonts in a smaller font.
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Figure 2: Number of publications with a definition of phishing, till August 2013.
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Figure 3: Search, selection and review of the results.
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Additional file 1 — List of all definitions
This file includes a table with all included definitions.
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Table 1: Definitions of phishing from four dictionaries and the APWG.
Source Definition
Oxford (UK) The fraudulent practice of sending emails purporting to be
from reputable companies in order to induce individuals to
reveal personal information, such as passwords and credit card
numbers, online.
Collins (UK) The practice of using fraudulent e-mails and copies of legiti-
mate websites to extract financial data from computer users
for purposes of identity theft.
Merriam-Webster (USA) A scam by which an e-mail user is duped into revealing per-
sonal or confidential information which the scammer can use
illicitly.
American Heritage (USA) To request confidential information over the Internet or by
telephone under false pretenses in order to fraudulently obtain
credit card numbers, passwords, or other personal data.
APWG (USA) Phishing is a criminal mechanism employing both social engi-
neering and technical subterfuge to steal consumers’ personal
identity data and financial account credentials. Social engi-
neering schemes use spoofed e-mails purporting to be from le-
gitimate businesses and agencies, designed to lead consumers
to counterfeit websites that trick recipients into divulging
financial data such as usernames and passwords. Technical
subterfuge schemes plant crimeware onto PCs to steal cre-
dentials directly, often using systems to intercept consumers
online account user names and passwords – and to corrupt
local navigational infrastructures to misdirect consumers to
counterfeit websites (or authentic websites through phisher-
controlled proxies used to monitor and intercept consumers’
keystrokes).
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Table 2: Concepts used in the phishing definitions: χ2-tests are used to determine
whether the frequency of use of a concept is significantly more or less than 50% of
all definitions.
Type Extracted concept Occurrence (N) χ2 p
Asset Mentioning information* 105 83.27 .00

Consensus
Actor Mentions a target* 87 44.61 .00
Activity Phishing is digital* 87 32.93 .00
Activity Phishing is Internet-based* 84 26.77 .00
Activity Using deception* 79 17.92 .00
Activity Communication from target to offender 64 1.99 .16

No consensus
Activity Communication from offender to target 62 1.07 .30
Activity Phishing is a criminal activity 61 0.72 .40
Activity Using impersonation 60 0.43 .51
Activity Phishing uses websites 56 0.01 .93
Activity Phishing uses messages 51 1.07 .30
Actor Mentions a trusted third party 50 1.50 .22
Activity Phishing is fraud* 43 6.45 .01

Consensus
Actor Mentions an offender* 40 9.64 .00
Activity Using persuasion* 30 24.86 .00
Activity Mentions the later abuse of information* 22 42.13 .00
Activity Related to identity theft* 20 47.16 .00
Activity Related to social engineering* 19 49.78 .00
χ2-test with df=1. N=113. Boldfaced concepts are included in standard. * p < 0.05
